For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, *Nash payoff selection correspondence* of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence having the *K*-limit property (i.e., if the Nash payoff selection sub-correspondence contains its *K*-limits and therefore is a *K *correspondence), then the discounted stochastic game has a stationary Markov equilibrium. Our key result is a new fixed point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having the *K*-limit property. We also show that if the discounted stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), or if the underlying probability space satisfies the *G*-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin (1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and therefore satisfies the coaser transition kernel condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the Nash payoff selection correspondence contains a sub-correspondence having the *K*-limit property.